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Paying kidney donors: time to follow Iran?
Rupert WL Major*
Since the first kidney transplant was performed over
fifty years ago, it has offered the chance of life and the
freedom from dialysis for thousands of people.
However, demand for organs has always exceeded
supply. The gap between the two is widening due to
increased prevalence of diseases common to a ‘western’
lifestyle such as diabetes and hypertension, leading to
more chronic kidney disease and renal failure.
Renal transplants differ from most other transplants
because living people are able to donate without
significant adverse effects on their own health. Donated
kidneys, therefore, have a potential to become a
commercial asset. They can be harvested from cadavers
or from living human donors. Living Related Donation
(LRD) has become the organ source of choice and most
common method. Supply, however, is still greatly
inferior to demand: the United States Department of
Health and Human Services 2006 Annual Report
recorded over 82,000 patients on the waiting list for a
kidney, up nearly 7% from the previous year (1).
In order to resolve the shortage of donors, some have
advocated financial payments being made to donors.
Despite being illegal in most countries, the trade
appears to be booming in nations such as Turkey,
Russia, and South Africa (2). Just as waiting lists and
costs motivate some people to travel outside of their
country of residence for procedures such as hip
replacements and cosmetic surgery - a phenomenon
called ‘health tourism’, a similar phenomenon appears
to be occurring on a smaller scale for organ transplants
(3). The dilemma physicians and health officials are
faced with is whether to close their eyes to this trade,
disregarding ethical implications and the adverse effects
of surgeries done on the black market, or to legalize it
and try to establish boundaries to protect organ donors
that receive compensation.
Currently, the World Health Organisation estimates
that of the 660,000 people in the world who require any
form of transplant, 10% receive one each year (4). Of
these, 10% receive their transplant through commercial
‘transplant tourism’(4). The lack of donors and the rise
of ‘transplant tourism’ have recently forced regulatory
organisms throughout the world to act. The European
Union tried to boost organ donations by suggesting a
Europe-wide donor card, and has formed a regulatory
body to standardize quality and safety within
transplantation in an effort to reduce commercial
transplants. The People’s Republic of China, which
performs more transplants per year than any other
country except the USA (5), has recently introduced
tougher restrictions and penalties for commercial
transplantation (5).
One of the few countries that has legalised the sale of
organs is Iran (6). The first kidney transplant in Iran
took place forty years ago. However, in the following
twenty years only one hundred were performed overall
within Iran. This was mainly due to the lack of
infrastructure available to develop and maintain a
kidney transplant network within the country. In the
early 1980’s, the Iranian government recognized the
increasing strain on dialysis resources as the end stage
renal failure population grew in Iran. The government
began to pay for its citizens to have living related
transplants abroad, the majority in the UK. Four
hundred such transplants were funded in a five year
period (5). As these costs started to spiral, a small
network of renal transplantations teams was set up
within Iran and just under one hundred transplants were
carried out per year from 1985 to 1987 (6). The
development of an Iranian renal transplant network of
this size was a drop in the ocean compared to over
25,000 people living with end-stage renal disease in
Iran, many of which live in rural areas and do not
readily have access to medical care (6).
In 1988, Iran legalized living non-related donation
(LNRD) of kidneys and established an associated
transplantation system. This government-organized
system regulated and funded the transplantation process
and compensated the donors for their organ. A third-
party independent association was set up to arrange
contact between donors and recipients. This agency, the
Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association (DTPA),
still carries out this function to this day and is staffed on
a voluntary basis by end-stage renal failure patients. An
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outlawed to prevent the development of true
‘transplantation tourism’ and international exploitation
of Iranian donors. In addition, refugee groups (such as
those from Afghanistan) are offered transplants but are
not allowed to donate to people outside of their ethnic
groups, further decreasing potential exploitation of
vulnerable groups (6).
Opponents of the Iranian system insist that the system
is not as perfect as it seems. There is evidence to
suggest Iran’s system has not cleared its waiting list and
that trading between socioeconomic classes is a
substantial problem (7). Critics of the Iran model would
argue that even this well developed system has major
flaws and that a ban on payment to LNRD should be
maintained in other parts of the world.
Outside of Iran, the issue continues to be highly
contentious. The end-stage renal failure population
continues to increase in most countries, putting an
increasingly heavy load on medical infrastructure.
Compensation for living non-related donors, once a
taboo subject, has now begun to be discussed openly in
transplantation meetings and the medical literature (9,
10, 11). The advocates for legalization argue that each
of us has autonomy over our own body in every aspect
of our health and that from this stems the right to donate
a kidney to a related or non-related patient. Payment for
sperm and eggs is legal in many countries, even though
they arguably have greater long-term implications due
to the potential to create a whole new individual.
Similarly to compensation received for participation in
some clinical trials, the individual also gains no
immediate benefit from putting themselves at risk.
However, opponents argue that the donation of a kidney
is permanent, which sets it apart from the examples
given above. LNRD supporters argue that after the
initial peri-operative risk, the donor has no long term
increased risk of mortality (12). Furthermore, the risk
surrounding the surgical procedures is low in most
centers, with a 0.02% risk of death during surgery and
its immediate complications and less than a 1% risk of
other morbidities (12). Most importantly, in the longer
term, a recent meta-analysis has shown that there is no
significant acceleration in decrease in glomerular
filtration rate (beyond that expected due to aging) in
kidney donors fifteen years after transplantation (13).
It could be argued that if the medical profession truly
believes in full patient autonomy, care requested with
informed consent by a patient should be allowed
provided a fair, regulated system is in place. As with
recreational drug use, it is a question society faces in
many areas: is the harm of the activity in question
reduced and better controlled in a regulated market? As
ESRF continues to grow in prevalence, the problem of
important problem with this system is that human
leucocyte antigen (HLA) matching of tissues, necessary
to improve the chance of graft survival and prevent host
rejection, is not routinely performed. .
Within the first year of the establishment of this
system, the number of transplants had almost doubled;
nearly four fifths were from living unrelated sources
(6). In addition to payment from the government,
donors also receive free health insurance and often
payment from the recipient or a charity. The receiver of
the ‘new’ kidney is provided with highly subsidized
immunosuppression and charitable organizations allow
those unable to pay for the transplant themselves to
receive a new organ. Importantly, it is illegal for the
medical and surgical teams involved or any
‘middleman’ to receive payment (6). A potential donor
is also not allowed to contact anyone on the waiting list.
Despite, this, anecdotal stories of young men touting
their ‘spare’ kidney in dialysis clinics are common (7).
There is no nationwide transplant registry in Iran so
the outcomes of renal transplantation, regardless of
source, are difficult to assess. However, the Hashemi
Nejad Hospital (HNH) in Tehran, one of the leading
hospitals in Iran, does provide detailed analysis of its
data. In the twenty years up to the beginning of 2006,
just under two thousand transplants in HNH were
performed, three quarters of which were LNRD (4).
Despite no HLA matching, results are similar in terms
of both graft and patient survival between LNRD and
LRD in both Iran and other countries (6, 7). The
extrapolation of these results to other, smaller centers in
Iran is however limited.
Whilst still illegal in ‘Western’ nations, could the
‘Iranian model’of payment for LNRD be used in North
America or Europe to solve the problems of kidney
donor shortages? A hotly disputed topic is whether the
Iranian system has actually cleared the waiting list for
transplants and whether LNRD is the true answer to the
problem (7). Advocates of the Iranian model insist that
where there was once a significant waiting time in
excess of the length in ‘Western’ nations, there is now
no waiting time. Further, there are “no significant
differences” in groups of donors and recipients when
compared in terms of socioeconomic background
(wealth and education level). Thus significant social
exploitation is not occurring (7). It should be noted,
however, that investment in cadaveric donation
programs has allowed them to increase significantly,
and they now accounts for more than 10% of transplants
(6) (however, this is compared with almost 60% in the
US (8)). The Iranian system is known to have ethical
and legal loopholes which have been exposed and
exploited. One of the earliest problems involved
patients from abroad travelling to Iran to receive a
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increase rapidly, the idea of financial compensation for
LNRD of kidneys will continue to be with us. Until an
alternative to human donors can be found, either
artificial or xenotransplantation (animal) based, then
this ethical issue will continue to be discussed and
considered within transplantation and wider medical
communities. Whether talk will ever be turned to action
in favour of monetary payments to donors remains to be
seen. The medical profession may not agree with
payments on an ethical level but the increasing
problems caused by prohibition of LNRD and the
prolific black market of transplants are starting to be
considered as good reasons for legalization and tight
regulation.
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unregulated organ markets and brokers is likely to
become more severe. It is argued that the setting up of
regulated markets would ‘cut out the middleman’ and
reduce the exploitation of individuals and developing
nations. In situations where there are no regulations, the
donors are maximally exploited and are often left with
no supportive care once donation has taken place (3). In
addition, inferior surgical and medical practice,
common on the black market, leave both the donor and
recipient at greater risk whilst the broker pockets a large
cut of the proceeds.
A possible compromise is a non-monetary reward
system. For instance, patients who have previously
agreed to be on the transplant list could receive priority
health care. It has also been suggested that
governments should control the monetary aspects of the
transactions rather than payment passing directly from
individual to individual. The donor would effectively
sell their organ to the state which would then allocate it
on the basis of clinical need. By making the process
more medically transparent, it may placate to some
degree those who accuse pro-monetary transplantation
advocates of disregarding the exploitation of the poor
by the rich. It is also likely that a ‘fair’ standard price
could be set to prevent those in desperate financial need
from being even further exploited. Using economic
cost-effectiveness analyses, a figure of approximately
$90,000US (£45,000 or 67,000 Euros) has been
proposed (14), much less than the estimated cost of
dialysis of up to $70,000US per annum per patient (15).
Government intervention would also guarantee
adequate post-operative care and follow-up for the
donor, something which is currently limited.
Finally, the medical profession’s view on the ethics of
commercial transplantation must be considered. The
consensus within the transplantation community is
largely against LNRD legalization but increasingly,
voices are calling for its allowance. The World Health
Organization is strongly opposed to payment for any
form of organ (17). This has been partly shown in
primary care physicians with 90% and 20% in favour of
related and non-related kidney transplants respectively
(although there was no mention of commercial payment
in the non-related cases) (16). In addition, the overall
view appears to be negative towards those who would
be actually carrying out the transplantation. The role of
commercial transplantation surgeons has cheekily been
described in an article in the British Medical Journal as
“‘Rotten Jobs” that consist of “harm[ing] a poor person
and sav[ing] a rich one” (18).
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